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ABSTRACT 
SAUDI ARABIA'S USE 
OF AIR POWER CAPABILITIES 
TO SECURE ITS NATIONAL SECURITY ASSETS 
IN THE NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF ARENA 
By 
Ian M. Raimundo 
University of New Hampshire, May 2009 
Iran represents the primary threat to Saudi Arabia's foreign national 
security interests. Iranian hostility originates in the 1979 Iranian Islamic 
Revolution and also consists of threats to Saudi Arabia's internal security.1 
Saudi Arabia's strategy to safeguard its national security assets, including 
petroleum processing and export facilities vital to the smooth flow of 
crude oil, relies on an advanced air defense capability to provide early 
warning of an aircraft or ballistic missile attack. 
In contrast to the expected outcome of Robert Jervis' theory, a 
greater quantity of weapons but an overall decreased level of security, 
Saudi Arabia has increased their foreign security with respect to the 
Iranian combat aircraft threat to their national security interests in the 
Persian Gulf. Current developments by the two sides indicates an 
increasing downwards 'spiral of hostility' as each side acquires arms to 
offsets the others' increase in security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Iran represents the primary threat to Saudi Arabia's foreign national 
security interests. Iranian hostility originates in the 1979 Iranian Islamic 
Revolution and also consists of threats to Saudi Arabia's internal security.1 
Saudi Arabia status as 'the world's largest producer and exporter of total 
petroleum liquids' depends on two petroleum processing and export 
facilities.2 Protection of these facilities from conventional and 
unconventional attacks is essential to Saudi Arabia's ability to process and 
export crude and should therefore be of foremost concern to consumers 
of Saudi Arabian crude oil. 
Chapter 1 discusses case and theory justifications for this research. 
The importance of Saudi Arabia as a reliable producer of crude oil to 
global markets and the need to safeguard two petroleum processing and 
exporting facilities, Saudi Arabia's primary national security assets is 
explained. As the House of Saud, the dynasty that governs Saudi Arabia, 
must counter unconventional threats to the internal stability and security 
ot the state, including organized militant Islamic groups that have 
targeted the Kingdom's oil facilities, a brief overview of the importance of 
internal security is outlined. More detailed information regarding the 
internal security and stability is provided in the endnotes section.3 
Robert Jervis' theory expects when states acquire arms to increase 
their security, other states are inadvertently threatened, and also acquire 
arms, leading to an overall decrease in security. Jervis' theory is used to 
explore Saudi Arabia's security policy, which center on the capabilities of 
air power, to evaluate whether the Kingdom's defense acquisitions have 
increased, or, as the theory expects, decreased its security when 
compared to the capabilities of Iran, the Kingdom's foremost adversary. 
Chapter 2 discusses Saudi Arabia's security policy and compares 
the capabilities of the Royal Saudi Air Force and Air Defense Forces to the 
Iranian Air Force. In the 1970s Saudi Arabia relied on the Shah of Iran to 
provide air security for its northern and eastern territories, including the 
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Persian Gulf oil-producing region.4 The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq Conflict in September 1980 altered Iran's status 
as the Kingdom's security provider to the foremost security threat.5 In 
response to the newly hostile Iran, Saudi Arabia procured an advanced 
early-warning air defense capability from the United States that continues 
to serve as the Kingdom's primary means to safeguard its national security 
assets and population centers. 
One aspect of Jervis' theory that does not apply concerns the 
presence of a regional hegemon. In 1980 President Carter declared the 
Persian Gulf oilfields as vital to the national security interests of the United 
States.6 The presence of the United States as the regional hegemon in the 
Persian Gulf is an important element of Saudi Arabia's foreign and internal 
security.7 
Chapter 3 discusses the measures taken by Saudi Arabia to 
increase its foreign security in response to the conventional Iranian aircraft 
and ballistic missile threat. Although there are two spirals of hostility 
3 
between the two sides, the spirals originate from a common source, the 
1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. Furthermore, the second spiral is the 
direct result of Iran's over-dependence on the United States for military 
hardware, support, and training services; the results of Iran's efforts to 
indigenously produce ballistic missile have only recently coming to fruition 
since 1998.8 
The second spiral involves the reaction of Saudi Arabia and the five 
other member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to Iran's 
ballistic missile program. The GCC states are acquiring the most 
advanced terminal-area anti-ballistic missile system and networking their 
air defense assets to improve coordination and overall effectiveness.9 
Further indicative of a developing 'spiral of hostility,' the GCC states are 
pursuing additional combat aircraft despite their already uncontested air 
supremacy over Iran.10 
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CHAPTER 1 
CASE AND THEORY JUSTIFICATIONS 
This research is an examination of Saudi Arabia's foreign security 
policy, concentrating on measures adopted to safeguard its petroleum 
processing and export facilities from the threat of an air strike. Robert 
Jervis' theory expects states attempting to increase their security by 
acquiring weaponry to experience a decrease, not increase, in their 
overall security. Jervis terms the mutual action-reaction process a security 
dilemma, and the concept is applied to evaluate whether Saudi Arabia's 
defense acquisitions have increased or decreased its foreign security 
when compared to the capabilities of a specific adversary. 
Saudi Arabia is a global heavyweight in the realm of crude oil 
production.11 The Kingdom's crude oil resources are the single largest 
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concentration of crude oil and consist of an estimated 267 billion barrels 
of crude oil, which is between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world's 
total known reserves; Saudi Arabia also maintains the largest crude 
production capacity in the world, estimated at 10.5 to 11 million barrels 
per day in 2007.12 Saudi Arabia's importance as a reliable oil producer is 
expected to increase as long-term global crude oil consumption 
continues to grow.13 
The House of Saud, Saudi Arabia's ruling dynasty, have proved 
themselves to be reliable custodians of their petroleum resources since 
1973 and have generally sided with United States policy in the intra and 
extra Persian Gulf arenas.14 Maintaining the primacy of the House of Saud 
and the internal stability and security of Saudi Arabia, although outside 
the focus of this research, should also be of importance to consumers of 
crude oil. Should violent regime change remove the Al-Saud from power, 
their successors may reduce or entirely shut-off the flow of oil, as was the 
case after the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, with disastrous 
consequences to the American and global economy.15 
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Section 1: The Economic Criticalitv of Crude Oil 
'Saudi Arabia is the world's largest producer and exporter of total 
petroleum liquids and is currently the world's second largest crude oil 
producer behind Russia.'16 In 2002 Saudi Arabian and United States 
intelligence discovered Al-Qaeda sympathizers 'had infiltrated Saudi 
ARAMCO and were planning to destroy key Saudi oil facilities.'17 
As a raw feedstock, crude oil is a versatile commodity that can be 
chemically altered for use in a variety of applications from combustion in 
aircraft engines to the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals to asphalt used 
for paving roads and highways.18 In the realm of transportation, which 
accounts for nearly two-thirds of America's total petroleum consumption, 
refined derivatives of crude oil, including aviation kerosene, gasoline, or 
diesel fuels provides 97% of the raw energy input required.19 
The United States consumes approximately 20 million barrels of 
crude oil per day, nearly one-quarter of daily global oil consumption.20 
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Crude oil is therefore a critical component of the American economy, the 
high price of which can exert a 'calamitous' effect on the American way 
of life; 'nine of the last ten U.S. recessions were preceded by an increase 
in crude oil prices, and statistical tests have demonstrated that this was 
not coincidental.'21 The United States currently imports nearly two-thirds of 
its crude oil from foreign sources.22 In 2006 and 2007 Saudi Arabia 
exported an average of 1.46 and 1.49 million barrels per day, respectively, 
to the United States, accounting for 12% of the United States' total crude 
imports.23 
Domestic crude oil production from sources in the continental 
United States and Gulf of Mexico peaked in December 1970 at slightly 
over 10 million barrels per day.24 Afterwards, U.S. crude production 
entered a 'steady and relentless decline,' ending the 'century-long run 
during which the United States dominated global oil supply,' despite the 
addition of crude extracted from reservoirs in Alaska.25 As United States oil 
production steadily declined, Saudi Arabian production steadily 
increased, due largely to naturally high reservoir pressures at five highly 
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prolific fields.26 The Oil and Gas Journal, a petroleum industry publication, 
assesses that Saudi Arabia contains approximately 267 billion barrels of 
crude oil, amounting to nearly one-fifth of the world's proven reserves.27 
Nearly two-thirds of Saudi Arabian crude is considered Arabian Light or 
Arabian Extra Light, grades considered economically desirable due to 
their lower processing costs.28 The Kingdom 'maintains the world's largest 
crude oil production capacity, estimated to be around 10.5-11 million 
barrels per day.'2930 
Although the smooth flow of Saudi Arabian crude to global energy 
markets depends on a network of more than 9,000 miles of pipeline, 
dozens of gas-oil separator plants, pumping stations, and individual 
wellheads, two specific facilities are of critical importance.31 Measured in 
terms of volume, Saudi ARAMCO's Abqaiq stabilization facility, 30 miles 
inland from the Persian Gulf, is the world's most productive oil processing 
facility.32 Abqaiq processes more than 7 million barrels per day of Arabian 
Light and Arabian Extra Light crude from southern area oil wells, removes 
hydrogen sulfur and other contaminants, reduces vapor pressure, and 
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forwards the majority of the processed crude to Ras Tanurah for export.33 
The processing operations at Abqaiq are essential for the safe transport of 
crude. Kenneth Pollack describes the criticality of the Abqaiq facility to 
the global economy as 'the beating heart,' further claiming 'if there is any 
one facility on Earth whose loss could cause massive, widespread 
economic damage, Abqaiq is it.'34 In February 2006 Saudi Arabian 
authorities foiled an attempt by Al-Qaeda to destroy the Abqaiq facility 
using explosives mounted in trucks.35 Should an attack on the Abqaiq 
facility inhibit the ability to process crude there is no alternative facility to 
process nearly two-thirds of valuable Arabian Light and Arabian Extra 
Light crude oils and Saudi Arabia's ability to export crude will at best be 
reduced or at worst completely cease.36 
The Kingdom exports more than lb% of its crude oil from Saudi 
ARAMCO's Ras Tanurah maritime complex, the world's largest crude 
export facility at Ras Tanurah and Juyaymah on the Persian Gulf coast, 
which has an export capacity of 6 million barrels per day. The Kingdom's 
current export capacity is estimated at between 14-15 million barrels per 
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day.37 After the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq Conflict in September 1980, Iran 
targeted 'Saudi Arabia's oil facilities, exports, and territory throughout the 
1980s, and specifically targeted the Ras Tanurah export complex.38 
The unimpeded operation of processing and export facilities at 
Abqaiq and Ras Tanurah are essential to the national security of Saudi 
Arabia and the United States. Should a conventional or unconventional 
attack prevent the export of crude from the Ras Tanurah complex, the 
export facility at Yanbu, on the Red Sea coast, is reportedly not utilized to 
full capacity and is capable of exporting 4.5 million barrels per day of 
crude.39 The Kingdom's current export capacity is estimated at between 
14-15 million barrels per day.40 
Section 2: The Importance of Internal Security 
Although this research focuses on Saudi Arabia's security policy to 
counter a foreign threat to its national security interests, a brief discussion 
of the criticality of internal security and stability is included to highlight the 
challenges posed to the Kingdom's national security interests by 
unconventional threats.41 In addition to protecting the country from 
foreign invasion, maintaining 'the domestic stability of the Al-Saud' is 
Saudi Arabia's secondary foreign policy objective.42 Although the Iranian 
unconventional threat to Saudi Arabia's internal security and stability has 
remained constant unlike the fractured spiral dynamics of the 
conventional threat, the Iranian Islamic Revolution remains the common 
source for both threats.43 The Iranian government explicitly challenged 
the legitimacy of the Saudi Arabian government, incited the Saudi Shi'a in 
the oil-producing Persian Gulf regime to revolt against their government, 
and utilized the annual Hajj to disseminate anti-Saudi propaganda.4445 
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Although Iran appears to have abandoned its practice of overtly inciting 
Shi'a elements of the Saudi population, which constitute an estimated 6% 
of the Saudi population, to revolt against their government and using the 
Hajj to attack the House of Saud, evidence continues to highlight Iran's 
involvement to subvert governments in the region by aiding internal 
opposition groups.46 Iran directed the June 1996 bombing of Khobar 
Towers, a U.S. military housing complex in the Eastern Province, which 
killed 19 U.S. servicemen.47 
The internal security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the 
dominance of the House of Saud as the Kingdom's governors is of utmost 
importance to the United States.48 'For decades, the basis of state-society 
relations has been the provision of goods and services by the state to 
society, with little but political loyalty expected in return.'49 Saudi Arabia is 
a rentier state that remains highly dependant on its petroleum resources 
for revenue.50 Oil revenue accounts for approximately 90% of total export 
earnings, 75% of state budget revenue and 45% of the gross domestic 
product.51 As Saudi oil revenue steadily increased in the late 1950s, 'oil 
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money came to supplement, and then to supplant, Wahhabism as the 
glue that keeps the Saudi realm together.'52 Saudi oil policy, therefore, 
'has to provide the government with the money necessary to support the 
system of social services, government employment, and security spending 
that undergirds the regime.'53 
The Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals, which consists of 
members of the Al-Saud, industry leaders, and government ministers, 
formulates Saudi Arabia's petroleum policy.54 Kenneth Pollack describes 
the Al-Saud Dynasty, governors of Saudi Arabia, as 'the ideal custodians 
of the world's largest oil reserves and (at most times) the largest 
percentage of global oil exports' because they 'just really want to make 
money.'55 The House of Saud 'understand that their oil wealth can keep 
their subjects happy and themselves living like princes for many decades' 
and therefore have a long-term interest in maintaining moderate oil 
pricing.56 The western reaction to the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which 
Riyadh participated in, defined Saudi Arabia's long-term strategy as a 
moderate, reliable producer.57 Saudi Arabian decision makers realized 
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that threats to curtail exports to the United States, their primary market, 
only accelerated efforts to increase efficiency and create alternative 
sources of energy.58 As a result, through conservation and research into 
alternative sources of energy, the United States reduced dependence on 
Saudi Arabian crude, thereby threatening the House of Saud's long-term 
outlook of maintaining dependency on crude exports to afford 
themselves and their citizens a comfortable lifestyle.59 Afterwards the 
Saudis decided 'that they would never do something so foolish again, a 
position they have kept to ever since.'60 Saudi Arabia's oil policy 'has thus 
regained the central role it held in the 1930s and 1940s for regime security 
as the vital source of revenue for the government.'61 
Saudi Arabia must also counter the unconventional threat to its key 
oil processing and export facilities. 'In December 2004, Usama bin Ladin 
explicitly called for attacks on oil facilities in the Persian Gulf and Caspian 
Sea-including on civilians working at these facilities.'62 Bin Laden believes 
the unequal distribution of oil wealth has resulted in 'political and social 
corruption in the 'Umma (the Islamic Community).63 Bin Laden has 
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promised to increase the price of oil should his Islamist movement come to 
power in Saudi Arabia to a 'fair' level; 'There is little reason to think that 
what bin Laden considers fair would not prove disastrous for the global 
economy.'64 Pollack also mentions that more extreme Islamist movements 
might adopt the position of Khomeini and entirely shut-off the flow of 
Saudi Arabian oil, instantly removing 11-13% of the global oil supply, with 
even more disastrous consequences to the global economy.65 
In addition to dire economic consequences, Kenneth Pollack 
argues that a successful attempt to overthrow the House of Saud would 
pose catastrophic implications for regional security and stability and the 
effects of regime change would be graver than those of the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution.66 The Al-Saud have a long-term strategy of 
maintaining temperate oil-pricing and have 'generally allowed market 
forces to prevail and at times have even used their excess production 
capacity to maintain an orderly market.'67 After the 1979 Iranian Islamic 
Revolution, believing Iran's oil wealth resulted in problems ranging from 
'cultural corruption of Iranian society to Western intervention in Iranian 
16 
politics,' under Khomeini's directive, Iranian oil production dropped from 
5.9 million barrels per day in 1978 to 1.3 million barrels per day in 1980.68 
The impact of Khomeini's policy 'crippled the Iranian economy and 
caused the worst recession in post-World War II U.S. history.'69 Pollack 
argues a 'Saudi Khomeini' who pursued the same policy 'could do far 
worse damage.'70 So important are the Al-Saud to the national security of 
the United States that should a serious internal rebellion or uprising occur 
within Saudi Arabia, Pollack believes the United States will act militarily to 
protect the authority of the House of Saud.71 
The National Guard is the means the House of Saud uses to secure 
'the domestic stability of the Al-Saud regime.'72 The Guard is also 
responsible for protecting Saudi oil facilities against unconventional 
attacks.73 A paramilitary organization, the Guard consists of 75,000 
soldiers and an additional 25,000 tribal reserves, and is equipped with an 
assortment of armored personnel carriers, light infantry fighting vehicles, 
and towed artillery pieces to defeat unconventional threats.74 In 
November 2007, Saudi Arabia announced the creation of an Industrial 
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Security Force for additional protection of its oil facilities against an 
unconventional attack.75 Currently at 9,000 members, the Industrial 
Security Force is expected to grow by 8,000 soldiers per year to 32,000.76 
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Section 3: The Capabilities of Air Power 
The Royal Saudi Air Force is the primary means Saudi Arabia uses to 
secure the primary foreign policy objective, protecting the country from 
foreign domination and/or invasion.'77 Measured in terms of land area, 
at 829,780 square miles, or slightly larger than one-fifth the land area of 
the United States, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the 13th largest 
sovereign state in the world.78 Its overall climate is harsh and 
characterized by large extremes in temperature differences.79 
Uninhabitable, sandy desert constitutes nearly half of the country's land 
area; only 1.67% of the land area is classified as arable.80 Frequent dust 
and sand storms are a constant occurrence and their severity inhibits land 
transportation.81 
Nadav Safran argues 'the constraints of vast space and scarce 
manpower' are two constraints the House of Saud must overcome in 
defending their state.82 Raymond Hinnebusch details Saudi Arabia's 
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principle vulnerability as a 'function of its large sparsely settled territory, 
with long, difficult-to-defend borders.'83 J.E. Peterson argues the size of 
the state and length of Saudi Arabia's frontiers further precludes 'reliance 
on land-based defense nearly impossible, even if it were not for the 
manpower restrictions faced by the Kingdom.'84 Kathleen Mclnnis offers a 
similar assessment, detailing 'the sheer size of Saudi Arabia coupled with 
its small population renders the physical defense of its territory extremely 
difficult.'85 
Given the challenging geographic conditions, it is little surprise that 
since the 1920s, when the House of Saud, the dynastic rulers of Saudi 
Arabia, witnessed Royal Air Force aircraft pursue and destroy Ikhwan 
warriors deep into the desert, they have 'been immensely impressed by 
the capabilities of air power and have viewed it as the key to their 
defense problems' and have desired 'to create a credible military 
deterrence based on the strength of the Royal Saudi Air Force.'86 The 
House of Saud desires the RSAF to be the foremost element of their foreign 
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security strategy and seeks the force to be 'realistically dominated by 
Saudi princes' and loyal recruits.87 
Saudi Arabia has chosen to protect its national security interests 
against a conventional Iranian air attack with a sophisticated air defense 
network. Saudi Arabia's strategy for internal and external defense has its 
roots in a 1974 field survey conducted by the Department of Defense.88 
The survey, implemented over a 10-year time span, specified the 'defense 
of the Kingdom's oil resources, facilities, and transit routes against external 
attacks' as the primary objective to be defended by a highly capable air 
defense network centered around Dhahran.89 The same survey specified 
the deployment of the Army to military cities constructed at 'great 
expense' to the Kingdom's sparsely settled frontier regions, in close 
proximity to foreign overland access routes, and the deployment of the 
National Guard to protect oil installations in the Eastern Province, within 
the urban regions, as well as to form a barrier between the Army and the 
Al-Saud powerbase in the Najd central region.90 
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Section 4: Theory Justification 
Robert Jervis's article Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma 
discusses the effects of uncertainty and arms acquisitions by states that 
may lead to armed conflict between them. The theory posits that states 
are uncertain of the motives behind other states' acquisition of weapons, 
tend to focus on the capabilities of these weapons rather than on the 
intent to use them, and consequently are threatened by their arming. 
Motivated by fear and uncertainty, the state is likely to react and acquire 
additional arms 'not because they are contemplating aggression, but 
because they fear attack from the first state.'91 
Jervis defines this situation as a security dilemma, which may exist 
when 'many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security 
decrease the security of others.'92 The security dilemma is characterized 
by an action-reaction competition between states, the outcome of which 
may leave states with a greater quantity of arms but decreased overall 
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security. Since states concentrate on the capabilities rather than the 
intent to use them, when one state arms the other is compelled to 
achieve at least a similar level of capability to achieve parity. The 
continual action-reaction process sets up a spiral dynamic that may trend 
towards a 'zero-sum' game unless the spiral is interrupted. According to 
Jervis, states that do not understand how the security dilemma operates, 
and who engage in arms competition may find themselves 'if not in a 
war, then at least in a relationship of higher conflict than is required by the 
objective situation.'93 
The theory discussion will concentrate on 'subjective security 
requirements,' which may set off 'spirals of hostility' between states. The 
theory is utilized to explore Saudi Arabia's security policy in order to 
evaluate whether there are any negative implications to the Kingdom's 
massive military acquisitions, as the theory suggests. In order to assess a 
net increase or decrease in security, Saudi Arabia's capabilities must be 
compared to the capabilities of a specific adversary, in this case Iran. 
In the discussion of offensive versus defensive weapons, Jervis is 
utilizing the concept of capabilities. Expanding on Jervis' theory, Charles 
L. Glaser defines capabilities as 'the state's ability to perform military 
missions, not to the size of its forces or its total military assets.'94 The 
capability definition, however, is only useful to assess an increase or 
decrease in foreign security when compared to the capabilities of a 
specific adversary. 
The Saudi Arabian government has acquired amongst the most 
sophisticated weapons systems produced by American and Western 
European manufacturers. A report issued by the Congressional Research 
Service dated August 18, 1982 asserts the transfer of the most 
sophisticated weapons systems in the American military's arsenal are 
generally restricted to NATO members and major industrial allies.95 The 
same report declares 'only seven Third World countries appear to be 
receiving U.S. weapons of similar sophistication,' stating Saudi Arabia ranks 
second behind Israel in terms of total sophistication.96 Examples of 
sophisticated aircraft acquired include F-15C/D air superiority aircraft in 
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1979; the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the 
KE-3A aerial refueling aircraft, and F-15C/D upgrades in 1981; Tornado air 
superiority and strike aircraft in 1985 and 1988; multi-role F-15S aircraft in 
1992; finally the multi-role Eurofighter Typhoon, deliveries expected to start 
in late 2008.97 
Saudi Arabia has also expended massive financial outlays to create 
and maintain a defense establishment. From the time period from 1972 to 
1988, Saudi Arabia's military expenditures accounted for 17% of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), the highest it has spent on defense 
expenditures.98 From 1950 to 1997, the Kingdom spent approximately 
$93.8 billion in defense expenditures from the United States alone, 
although only 21% of this figure accounted for 'lethal equipment;' 32%, 
the largest portion, went towards support services, and 19% for the 
construction of bases and facilities.99 The highest defense spending for 
equipment purchases occurred between 1985 and 1992, during the 
context of the Iran-Iraq Conflict, when Riyadh signed weapons transfer 
agreements worth $63.6 billion, an average of $6.5 in annual transfers, 
25 
which represented nearly 19% of all acquisitions by the developing 
world.100 Defense expenditures for 2005, the most recent figures available, 
indicate the Kingdom is tied with Qatar the world's 2nd foremost spender 
of defense expenditures, which account for 10% of the Kingdom's GDP.101 
Conclusion 
The ability of the House of Saud to protect Saudi Arabia's petroleum 
infrastructure from an attack, foreign or domestic should be of concern to 
states that depend on crude oil for their energy needs. Since the House 
of Saud determine the Kingdom's petroleum policy, permit market forces 
to determine the pricing of crude, and are committed to a long-term 
strategy of reliably supplying crude to world markets, it is imperative to the 
global economy that they maintain control of the state. 
Long-term forecasts indicate pressure on oil exporting states to 
increase crude oil production is expected to increase as global crude oil 
consumption is projected to increase by 50% from 2005 to 2030.102 Since 
the Persian Gulf states have the greatest actual and potential capacity to 
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increase crude oil production, global reliance on Persian Gulf oil is 
expected to increase from 27% in 2007 to 35% by 2030.103 Because of its 
massive crude reserves, production, expansion, and export capacity, 
Saudi Arabia is expected to encounter increasing pressure to increase 
production commensurate with global demand.104 
CHAPTER 2 
SECURITY POLICY AND CAPABILITIES 
One area where Jervis' theory does not seem to apply concerns 
the presence of an 'international sovereign.' In the Persian Gulf, the 
United States, an important element of Saudi Arabia's security policy, 
serves as the regional hegemon, extends conventional and nuclear 
deterrence, and is the foremost supplier of advanced weaponry to the 
Saudis.105 The United States deems the security of Saudi Arabian oilfields 
to be a vital American national security interest and has demonstrated its 
intent to protect the oilfields during three crises; in the mid 1960s during 
the Egyptian campaign in Yemen, after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq 
Conflict in 1980, and during the First Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991 J06 
The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution defined Saudi Arabia's security 
policy which capitalizes on the capabilities of air power to provide a 
security umbrella over the Kingdom. Formerly dependant on Iran for 
security of its northern and eastern territories, as well as the Persian Gulf 
coastal waters, which includes the oil producing areas, the emergence of 
a hostile threat after the Islamic Revolution in close proximity to vulnerable 
facilities and population centers compelled the Saudis to acquire an air 
defense capability to safeguard their national security assets.107 
Saudi Arabia's air defense capability, regarded as one of the most 
advanced air defense networks outside of the NATO arena, is the primary 
means the Kingdom utilizes to secure its national security assets from a 
foreign air attack.108 An overall assessment finds the air forces of the 
Persian Gulf states as far superior to that of Iran.109 In regards to the 
capabilities of Saudi Arabia and Iran, a recent military analyst declares 
that 'despite the manpower imbalance between forces, Arab Gulf states 
are better equipped to damage Iran and resist counter-strikes.'110 Iran has 
conceded defeat in the realm of air power capabilities, decided that 
reinvestment in their air power capabilities is futile, and is instead pursuing 
a program to indigenously produce medium range ballistic missiles.111 
Section 1: Security Policy 
Pre-1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution 
Robert Jervis theorizes that in the international system, due to the 
absence of an 'international sovereign,' an 'institution or authority that 
can make and enforce international laws,' states are not mandated to 
cooperate in order to peacefully resolve disputes.112 This aspect of Jervis' 
theory does not readily conform to the Persian Gulf, however, as the 
region has witnessed the intermittent presence of a regional hegemon 
since the United Kingdom sponsored a 'maritime truce' in 1835.113 The 
premise of the treaty amongst Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the Trucial 
Sheikhdoms (currently the United Arab Emirates) and the United Kingdom 
recognized London as regional mediator and security provider.114 The 
presence of the British also tempered Ibn Saud's expansionist ambitions 
towards the smaller coastal states, with many Saudis believing 'they would 
be ruling over the entire peninsula today.'115 In January 1968 the United 
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Kingdom announced its intent to depart the Persian Gulf area and cease 
providing security by the end of 1971.116 
Iran's central geographic location within the region, coastline that 
spans the entire length of the Persian Gulf, abundant petroleum resources, 
and 'old and territorially established civilization' are four principle factors 
contributing towards Iran's long-standing foreign policy characteristic of 
'the drive towards regional supremacy.'117 Iran's perception as a 'natural' 
state in the Middle East, 'uniquely qualified to determine, at the very least, 
the destiny of the Gulf subregion,' furthers Iran's belief that it 'can and 
should have influence beyond its borders.'118 Claiming Iran's 'historic 
responsibilities,' Shah Reza Pahlavi promptly volunteered to function as 
the primary regional security provider as proposed by Nixon's 'Twin Pillars' 
policy in 1969.119 
Saudi Arabia's security policy in the 1970s is characterized by its 
dependence on Iran as a foreign security provider. Under the Shah, in the 
1970s Iran 'embarked on the largest military buildup in the region' with 
assistance from the United States for military hardware, training, and 
31 
support services.120 In cooperation with American defense corporations 
Northrop, Bell, and Vickers, in the early 1970s the Shah initiated programs 
to natively produce 'helicopters, aircraft, guided missiles, electronics, and 
tanks.'121 For nearly one decade, with Washington's and Riyadh's 
approval, Iran provided security for Saudi Arabia's northern and eastern 
frontiers, including the oil producing areas and tanker transit routes 
through the Straight of Hormuz.122 
Saudi Arabia's reliance on Iran for security in thel970s permitted the 
initiation of programs for internal development. Declared unified by Ibn 
Saud in 1932, the Saudis had 'overwhelming work to do at home' after the 
initiation of the First Five-Year Development Plan, a comprehensive 
strategy to develop the Kingdom's social services, organize and develop 
the government, and construct infrastructure, which were essentially non-
existent until the initiation of First Five-Year Plan.123 
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Post 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution Security Policy 
Saudi Arabia's security problems with Iran originate with the 1979 
Iranian Islamic Revolution, which defined Saudi Arabia's domestic and 
foreign security policy. The 'Twin Pillars' policy collapsed after the 1979 
Iranian Islamic Revolution and altered Iran's status from Saudi Arabia's 
'strategic shield to a major threat' in the Persian Gulf.124 
Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve its sovereignty in the Middle East by 
avoiding international isolation and balancing with regional states to 
prevent the emergence of a strong regional hegemon.125 Within the 
Arabian Peninsula, which the Kingdom perceives as its sphere of 
influence, Saudi Arabia tends to adopt a hegemonic role amongst the 
smaller GCC states, who generally defer to Saudi leadership.126 
Iran's political system in the post revolutionary period is 
characterized by factionalism, fragmentation, institutional competition, 
and consists of hard-liners, nationalists, and pragmatists.127 Iran's long 
term objective in the Middle East is to replace American hegemony.128 
Pollack argues 'convincing the Iranian regime to give up its most radical, 
anti-status quo policies is going to be very difficult,' believing the hard-
liners will not agree to more moderate policies.129 The hard-liners 
constitute a powerful faction of the government, command the loyalty of 
the military, promote an aggressive, anti-American, anti-status quo foreign 
policy, and oppose 'any accommodation with the United States and our 
allies in the region (from Saudi Arabia to Egypt to Israel).'130 On July 8, 
2008, an aid to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, threatened 
to 'burn Tel Aviv and American ships in the Gulf, and strike at America's 
vital interests around the globe' if it were attacked.131 Earlier in 2008 Iran 
threatened to retaliate for military strikes on its suspected nuclear 
enrichment facilities by 'closing the Straight of Hormuz, the passage for 
roughly 40% of the world's traded oil, and striking at neighbouring 
countries.'132 
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Section 2: The U.S. Role in Saudi Arabian Security 
The United States features prominently in Saudi Arabia's security 
policy and functions as the regional hegemon in the Persian Gulf.133 The 
defense of the Persian Gulf oilfields have been a foremost priority for the 
United States military since President Carter declared the Persian Gulf as 
'a vital American interest during his 1980 presidential address;' successive 
American administrations have adopted similar policies towards Saudi 
Arabia.134 In the 1980s and 1990s the U.S. achieved its strategic objectives 
of reaching agreements permitting access to naval bases and airfields, 
the prepositioning of military supplies, joint training exercises, and the 
transfer of military equipment with several GCC states.135 The foremost 
U.S. objective of 'Pax Americana', the new world order, centered on 
securing 'unconstrained access to Gulf oil at "acceptable prices."136 
Although there is no formal defense treaty between the two states, since 
the 1950s Washington has unofficially guaranteed Riyadh's security 
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against external and internal threats and is the foremost supplier of high-
technology weaponry.137 The basis of security cooperation between 
Washington and Riyadh is a February 15, 1951 U.S. State Department 
policy brief that represented a 'definitive statement of American policy 
on, and aspirations for, the Kingdom and the House of Saud,' the majority 
of policies and guidance remain in effect.138 
The Islamic Revolution marked the initiation of the United States as a 
regional hegemon in the Persian Gulf. In February 1979 U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown 'pledged support for the kingdom against external 
threats, and proposed to base U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia to assist in its 
defense.'139 In October 1980, shortly after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq 
conflict, Washington deployed four AWACS early-detection aircraft to 
monitor hostilities between the two states which served as an intermediate 
solution until 1986 when the first RSAF AWACS aircraft arrived following the 
October 1981 AWACS agreement.140 
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U.S. -Extended Conventional Deterrence 
The United States extended conventional deterrence and 
established its credibility during four crises. During the Yemen conflict 
Washington signaled its broad willingness to 'intervene militarily if 
necessary to protect the Kingdom and secure the oil fields' as well as 
support the House of Saud from internal threats arising from the conflict.141 
As part of Operation Hardsurface, six U.S. Air Force F-lOODs were deployed 
to Dhahran in July 1963 after the outbreak of the Yemen conflict to deter 
Egyptian air attacks in the Eastern Province.142 In February 1979 U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 'pledged support for the kingdom 
against external threats, and proposed to base U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia 
to assist in its defense.'143 The next month the United States offered to 
send armed F-l 5 Eagle interceptors to the Kingdom in response to 
hostilities between North and South Yemen.144 Washington also deployed 
AW ACS aircraft to Riyadh to monitor the border war between the two 
Yemens in 1979, which remained in the Kingdom after the Iranian 
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Revolution and Iran-Iraq Conflict.145 The aircraft remained in the Kingdom 
until the RSAF AWACS and air defense network became operational in 
1986.146 
Due to domestic pressure and the rise of militant Islamic extremism 
within the Kingdom it is highly unlikely the U.S. will station a large 
contingent of forces on Saudi soil.147 The House of Saud perceives the 
presence of large contingents of foreign troops as more a liability than an 
asset, as it undermines the legitimacy of their regime.148 To support 
conventional deterrence, the U.S. maintains rapid-deployment power 
projection capabilities and a number of large bases in Europe. (USAF 
European Command Headquarters at Mildenhall, United Kingdom; US 
Army Europe Headquarters at Heidelberg, Germany; USAF 16th Air Force 
at Aviano, Italy; USAF 16th Air Force at Incirlik, Turkey; US Navy 5th Fleet in 
the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean; US Navy 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean 
Sea).149 
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U.S.-Extended Nuclear Deterrence150 
The U.S. nuclear umbrella serves is a necessary deterrent due to the 
massive size of Iran's manpower resources; Army, 350,000; Reserve Army, 
350,000; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 125,000, Paramilitary, 40,000; 
Basij Resistance Force/Paramilitary militia, between 1,000,000 to 
2,500,000.151 Furthermore, Iran has further demonstrated its ability to 
assemble large contingents of ground forces 'at short notice when it feels 
that its vital interests are threatened.'152 
Iran's ability to absorb sustained damage over a prolonged period 
of time further necessitates U.S-extended nuclear deterrence.153 The 
Iranians are 'military professionals' who have gained valuable experience 
from their eight-year conflict with Iraq and closely observed the American 
military involvement with Iraq.154 Saudi Arabia cannot utilize its primary 
strike aircraft, the F-15S, without extensive U.S. logistical and material 
support, thereby limiting the ability to deter Iran by threat of severe 
retalliation.155 
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Section 3: Saudi Arabian and Iranian Fixed-Wing Capabilities 
Saudi Arabian Capabilities 
The Saudi Arabian Peace Shield is a highly advanced network of 80 
air defense radars, consisting of long-range air surveillance radars, missile 
defense radars, and five E-3A AW ACS aircraft.156 Peace Shield is a means 
to integrate, coordinate, and control airborne, ground, and naval 
resources in real-time.157 Peace Shield air defense capabilities are 
optimized for 'defense-in-depth' against combat aircraft and cruise 
missiles and are considered one of the most advanced air defense 
networks outside the NATO arena.158 The system is arranged in three 
layers, to provide redundant coverage of outer, intermediate, and 
immediate distances from the Dhahran area.159 
For outer, intermediate, and immediate periphery defenses, Saudi 
Arabia operates 27 F-15S Eagles optimized for interception missions, 66 F-
15C Eagles and 18 F-15D Eagles.160 The F-15C/Ds are equipped with 
Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) that increase mission endurance time by 65% 
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to 93% depending on the mission profile.161 The RSAF operates 7 Boeing 
KE-3A tankers and 8 KC-130H Hercules aerial refueling aircraft.162 
Saudi Arabia's strike aircraft include 43 multi-role F-15S and 75 
Panavia Tornado Interdictor/Strike (IDS) aircraft.163 Contrary to initial plans 
at the time of its sale in December 1992, Washington imposed no 
restrictions or limitations to the offensive capabilities of the F-15S.164 In the 
wake of budget cuts which affected its overall capability following the 
First Persian Gulf Conflict, the RSAF has improved its readiness, combat 
effectiveness, joint warfare, and cooperation with other services; the RSAF 
is further improving its 'readiness, training, and maintenance' to the level 
of effectively exploiting its resources.165 
For interception of aircraft and missiles in the intermediate and 
immediate vicinity, the Air Defense Forces operate 16 batteries of Patriot 
Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) air defense missiles and 16 batteries of 
Improved-Hawk (l-Hawk) air defense missiles.166 
41 
Iranian Air Capabilities 
Iran operates a network of air surveillance radars but coverage of 
the entire state is believed to be severely deficient.167 Tehran is 
attempting to develop its air defense radar network, although the results 
of its efforts are unclear; the 2007 edition of The Military Balance reports a 
denial issued by Ukraine regarding transfer of the Kolchuga, a radar 
system with a reported range of 370 miles.168 
The Iranian Air Force is a mix of 281 American, Western European, 
Russian, and Chinese combat aircraft, mostly sourced during the reign of 
the Shah in the 1960s and 1970s, and now aged, mostly obsolete, and of a 
low serviceability level.169 The IISS deems serviceability levels of Iran's 
aircraft at 60% for American and West European warplanes and 80% for 
Russian and Chinese models.170 The ordinance supplied for American and 
Western European aircraft include a stock of some 3,000 AGM-65 
Maverick air-to-surface missile and AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles, but 
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due to their age and environmental storage conditions reliability of the 
missiles' electrical and propulsion components are low.171 
Similar to its combat aircraft, Iran's current SAM inventory consists of 
a mix of Western and Russian systems, also mostly obsolete.172 Iran is 
reportedly attempting to procure the Russian S-300/SA-20 SAM system, 
although the system does not appear the Military Balance 2008 
inventory.173 In 2007 Iran reportedly received 29 SA-15 Guideline and 10 
Pantsyr air defense systems.174 
Iran has chosen not to reconstruct its air force. The Iranian leaders 
are aware of the 'overwhelming air superiority of potential new 
adversaries,' and believe their overall air defense and air strike 
capabilities have degraded to the point that investment in them would 
be futile, and are instead pursing a program of military self-sufficiency.175 
Although Iran has the ability to acquire new aircraft, developments to 
improve its air power capabilities are minimal, and funding to develop an 
indigenous combat aircraft is low.176 The 2001-2002 Military Balance 
43 
predicted Iran would purchase the Su-27 or Su-30 aircraft; however the 
type is not listed in the 2008 Military Balance.177 
Conclusion 
The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution defined Saudi Arabia's security 
policy, shifting the Kingdom away from complete reliance on a foreign 
power towards greater security independence. The Kingdom's strategy 
to protect its national security assets depends on an air defense capability 
that can quickly detect, identify, and intercept a hostile aircraft. The 
strategy is not completely independent, however, as Riyadh depends on 
Washington to train, service, supply its armed forces, and function as the 
security provider for Saudi Arabia's foreign and domestic security.178 
Iran is aware of the superiority of Saudi Arabia's air power 
capabilities and the inferiority of their own air power capabilities and have 
decided that reinvestment in them is futile. Iran's strategy to regain its 
military strength is the pursuit of an independent ballistic missile program, 
which sets up the current pattern of spiral dynamics between Iran and the 




An important element Jervis contends is necessary to evaluate 
whether states can formulate compatible security policies is the concept 
of subjective security requirements. Security policies that mandate high 
security requirements to gain increments of security increase the 
probability of downwards 'spirals of hostility,' thereby reducing the 
probability of formulating compatible security policies.180 
As a result of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and conflict with Iraq, 
Iran's fixed-wing air capabilities have degraded to the point that Iran's 
military leadership no longer believes investment in them is cost 
effective.181 Consequently Iran believes an indigenous ballistic missile 
production capability is essential to restoring its military strength.182 
In a clear reflection of the expected outcome of Jervis' theory, a 
greater quantity of arms but overall decreased levels of security, arms 
acquisitions between Iran and the GCC states appears to indicate an 
increasingly developing downward spiral of hostility between the two 
sides. In response to Iran's first successful test of a ballistic missile in 1998, 
shortly afterwards, in 2000, the six GCC states initiated measures to 
implement a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile defense network. 
Measures taken by the GCC to ensure connectivity of all assets, from anti-
missile defense systems to strike aircraft are particularly noteworthy since 
the five smaller Arab Persian Gulf states have historically been weary of 
Saudi Arabian hegemony. In addition, planned acquisitions of additional 
combat aircraft by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman 
appear to suggest high subjective security requirements, especially since 
the GCC air forces are assessed to have uncontested air superiority over 
Iran's fixed-wing air capabilities. 
Section 1: The First Spiral 
The first spiral occurred after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq Conflict in 
September 1980. The Conflict 'dramatically altered the security 
environment on Saudi Arabia's eastern shores.'183 With no early warning 
capabilities, Saudi Arabian facilities and population centers, 150 miles 
across the Persian Gulf from Iranian airbases at Busheir, 'presented an 
easy and inviting target' which could be struck 'with virtually no warning' 
from Iranian strike aircraft in as little as 16 minutes.184 The flat topography 
and low terrain prevalent in the Eastern Province provides little in the way 
of geographical protection.185 The Saudis perceived their coastal and 
inland hydrocarbon processing and export facilities as too vulnerable to 
an Iranian air attack, and voiced broad concern for the safety of their 
crude oil tankers transiting through the Straight of Hormuz.186 
As the Conflict escalated, the Kingdom expressed 'unprecedented 
concern' with protecting its Eastern Province facilities and population 
centers on the Persian Gulf from an Iranian air attack.187 Throughout the 
course of the conflict, Iran threatened 'Saudi Arabia's oil facilities, exports, 
and territory throughout the 1980s, and specifically targeted Ras Tanurah, 
the primary maritime export facility for Saudi Arabian crude.188 In 1984 
Iranian aircraft struck Saudi crude oil tankers in Persian Gulf waters.189 
The first spiral is marked by a series of acquisitions by Saudi Arabia to 
construct a sophisticated early warning network to reduce the likelihood 
of a successful Iranian air attack on its coastal petroleum facilities and 
population centers. Iran constructed its military under the Shah with 
extensive American assistance, and therefore the requisite capabilities to 
strike Saudi Arabia were in place when a hostile Iran emerged after the 
Islamic Revolution.190 A quid-pro-quo process, therefore, does not mark 
the first spiral, where one side reacts to developments the other side is 
pursuing. The air defense agreement signed in October 1981 included 
five E-3A Sentry AWACS, 18 ground based radars, 8 KE-3A aerial refueling 
tankers, conformal fuel tanks and AIM-9L Sidewinders for F-15s, and the 
construction of support facilities.191 In September 1985 Riyadh signed the 
first phase of the Al-Yamamah (the Dove) Agreement with London, initially 
valued at $5 billion, which included the advanced Tornado IDS strike 
aircraft.192 
Termination of the First Spiral 
The 1979 Islamic Revolution aborted the spiral by inhibiting Iran's 
ability to compete with Saudi Arabia in a mutual action-reaction process. 
At the time of the Islamic Revolution, programs initiated by the Shah in 
cooperation with American defense corporations to indigenously 
produce military hardware were incomplete, American military advisors 
departed, and ties with the United States severed. 193 The Tehran hostage 
crisis resulted in Iran's international isolation through 'general 
condemnation, hostile UNSC resolutions, US-engineered economic 
sanctions and the seizure of Iranian assets.'194 Rachael Bronson describes 
the effects of 'Operation Staunch,' Washington's strategy to pressure 
partners and allies to stem the flow of weapons to Iran and Iraq, to Iran's 
military as 'particularly deleterious.'195 Although directed towards both 
Iran and Iraq, in practice Washington applied 'significantly more effort' to 
cease the flow of weapons to Iran than Iraq.196 Kenneth Pollack assess 
the effects of the Islamic Revolution 'crippled' the Iranian military after 
Washington severed military cooperation and American military advisors 
departed, further assessing that military 'has never regained the strength it 
once had.'197 The eight-year conflict between Iran and Iraq reduced the 
strength of Iran's conventional forces by 50-60%, and 'significant wear 
from harsh climate conditions and insufficient funding further deteriorated 
its military.'198 
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Section 2: The Second Spiral 
Iran's Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Program 
The second spiral is the result of Iran's inability to compete with the 
GCC states immediately after the Islamic Revolution. A direct result of the 
Islamic Revolution, the term 'Khod kafaye (self-sufficiency) refers to Iran's 
'deep desire to reduce its economic dependence on Western powers 
and outside economic forces.'199 To counter the negative effects of the 
Islamic Revolution on their military, the Iranians initiated military 
cooperation with North Korea.200 The IISS theorizes the effects of 
international sanctions left Iran with little choice but to initiate a path of 
independent production capabilities.201 The partnership with North Korea 
evolved to the field of ballistic missile development, whereby in exchange 
for providing missile components, North Korea received data from Iranian 
test flights.202 
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Iran's leaders believe achieving an independent missile production 
capability is a central element to restoring their military strength.203 Over 
the past 20 years Iran has steadily progressed towards an independent 
research, development, and production capability of a broad variety of 
military products, including cruise and medium-range ballistic missiles.204 
Iran's military industry currently produces nearly 2,000 defense proucts and 
exports to over 30 countries.205 
Iran's strategic missiles are under the command of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force, and consists of one brigade of six 
single launchers, each with fourShahab-3 (Meteor) medium-range 
ballistic missiles, Iran's most advanced medium-range ballistic missile, and 
one brigade of Shahab 1 /2 with 12-18 launchers.206 The Shahab-3A/M, 
also known as the Ghadr-101, has an estimated range of 1,050 miles, 
allowing Iran to deploy the missile at any point in the state and strike the 
Dhahran area.207 Western sources estimate the payload of the Shahab-3 
at 2,204 pounds and do not believe Iran's ballistic missiles currently have 
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle capability.208 The IISS 
estimates Iran is capable of producing 10 Shahab-3 medium range 
ballistic missiles per year.209 Iran's latest advance in medium-range 
ballistic missile technology is the successful test in November 2008 of 
advanced semi-solid fuel propulsion systems that increases the declared 
range of the Shahab to over 1,250 miles.210 
GCC Cooperation to Improve Anti-Missile Capabilities 
In what appears to be a clearly defined 'quo' reaction to the threat 
presented by Iran's ballistic missiles, the GCC states are increasing 
interoperability of their air defense network in order to improve anti-
ballistic missile defense capabilities.2" Although the elements are not yet 
entirely in place, the spiral appears to be approaching the point of full 
development; only when the GCC anti-ballistic missile components are 
actually acquired and deployed to their territory can the spiral be 
considered as developed. 
The strategy of increasing and improving collective air defense 
capabilities is particularly interesting because of the historical friction 
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between the GCC states and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia perceives the 
Arabian Peninsula as its 'natural sphere of influence,' and until the Iranian 
Revolution and Iran-Iraq Conflict, the GCC states 'resisted formal 
acknowledgement of Riyadh's leadership role' and have been as weary 
of Saudi Arabian as Iranian hegemony.212 The GCC states have been 
discussing increasing the size of 'Peninsula Shield, ' formed in 1986, from 
5,000 soldiers to at least 25,000 soldiers since December 2000.213 In 
November 2007 the GCC states once again discussed increasing the size 
of 'Peninsula Shield' to 22,000 soldiers and implementation of a joint-
command structure.214 To date the enlargement of 'Peninsula Shield' has 
not occurred. 
In contrast to discussions to expand 'Peninsula Shield,' the GCC has 
made substantial improvements in the realm of anti-missile defense 
capabilities. In December 2001 the six GCC states established a system, 
'Hizam al Taawun' (Cooperation Belt) to integrate their early warning air 
defense radar for broader coverage along the Persian Gulf.215 According 
to Lieutenant General Staff Pilot Prince Abdul Rahman Bin Fahed Al-Faisal, 
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Commander of the Royal Saudi Air Force, the objective is to interconnect 
member states with digital data links 'to commonly recognize air targets, 
and to distribute the relevant missions amongst their respective national 
Air Force and air defense assets.216 The IISS predicts the system can 
simultaneously track several hundred targets and is being developed to 
provide early warnings of ballistic and cruise missile launches.217 The 
premise behind the system is to allow each state to acquire radar 
information from the other states, providing broad area coverage from 
Egypt to Oman, and permit command-and-control decisions made in 
one state to serve as a master decision for the other states.218 Lieutenant 
General Staff Pilot Prince Al-Faisal further emphasizes the need for the 
GCC states to 'improve the system's swiftness in performance, and to add 
the technical requirements necessary to enable the member states of the 
Gulf Council getting the highest level of coordination between their 
operations centres.'219 
Major General Mohammed bin Saed Al-Qamzi, the United Arab 
Emirates Air Force Commander, deems a major priority of the U.A.E. 
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armed forces is to improve anti-ballistic missile capabilities to deter the 
threat posed by ballistic missiles.220 Similar to Saudi Arabia's strategy, the 
U.A.E. is pursing a layered defense strategy and fielding multiple 
systems.221 In September 2008 the U.A.E. announced its intent to acquire 
the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and Patriot PAC-3 air 
defense systems, two American systems designed specifically to intercept 
ballistic missile.222 The UAE is the first foreign state to acquire the THAAD, 
the most advanced terminal area anti-ballistic missile system.223 The 
United Arab Emirates is expected to network the THAAD into Hizam al 
Taawun, giving personnel in any GCC state command and control ability 
to launch an anti-ballistic missile missile deployed in the U.A.E. to intercept 
a ballistic missile converging on any GCC state.224 
The principle question Jervis seeks to answer is whether states can 
adopt compatible security policy, meaning 'can one state construct 
security policy that will not inadvertently threaten another state?' Jervis 
notes 'decision makers act in terms of vulnerability they feel, which can 
differ from the actual situation' and introduces the concept of subjective 
security requirements as 'the price they are willing to pay to gain 
increments of security.'225 If a state places a premium on their security, 
they are likely to 'be sensitive to even minimal threats, and to demand 
high levels of arms, which 'run the danger of setting off spirals of arms 
races and hostility.'226 
Subjective Security Requirements 
Indicative of high subjective security requirements, the GCC states 
are acquiring additional arms beyond those necessary for anti-ballistic 
missile defense. In December 2007 Kuwait announced its intent to acquire 
the Patriot PAC-3.227 Saudi Arabia is also in discussions to acquire the 
PAC-3.228 Saudi Arabia has also completed Link-16 communications 
upgrades on its AW ACS aircraft, permitting secure, near-real time 
exchanges of battlefield information.229 The U.A.E. is also acquiring 80 F-16 
multi-role aircraft and pursing Link-16 data links for its existing air defense 
capabilities and combat aircraft.230 Oman is also acquiring 12 F-16 multi-
role aircraft with Link-16 connectivity. The RSAF is acquiring 72 Eurofighter 
Typhoon multirole strike fighter aircraft. As the Kingdom is reportedly keen 
to receive the new aircraft, deliveries allocated to the RAF are being 
diverted to the RSAF and expected to commence towards the end of 
2008, continuing through 2011.231 The RSAF is also implementing the 
Tornado IDS GR.4 upgrade to significantly improve covert, all-weather, 
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deep-strike capabilities of the Tornado IDS fleet.232 The aircraft are being 
configured for advanced stand-off capabilities, including the Storm 
Shadow air-launched cruise missile and the Brimstone anti-armor missile.233 
The second dimension of subjective security involves threat 
perception, 'the estimate of whether the other will cooperate.'234 Recent 
examples of cooperation between the two sides do not include any 
discussions of security policy. Jervis mentions cooperation as a means to 
reduce uncertainty and alleviate fear. In the realm of security 
cooperation, treaties, inspection mechanisms, and mutual defense pacts 
are mentioned; none of these exist to reduce fear between either sides. 
In late 2008 Saudi Arabia invited Iranian President Ahmadinejad for the 
annual Hajj; the GCC states invited President Ahmadinejad to attend their 
annual summit meeting; on October 28 GCC Secretary-General Abdel 
Rahman Attiya visited Tehran and expressed hope for 'cementing and 
consolidating' relations.235 To date, however, President Ahmadinejad has 
not been invited to the February 2009 meeting, and Secretary-General 
Attiya compared Iran's occupation of Abu Musa, and the Greater and 
Lesser Tunubs, in the Straight of Hormuz, to the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian territory.236 In February 2009 Ali Akber Nateq Nouri, a 
conservative high-level advisor declared Bahrain to be Iran's 14th 




The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution is the source for both spirals of 
hostility. Although the first spiral did not fully develop and has a clear 
termination, the second spiral started in the time frame immediately 
following the Islamic Revolution, as Iran sought to restore its military 
strength after its international isolation. For some 20 years, therefore, some 
degree of overlap between the two spirals existed until Iran commenced 
testing its ballistic missiles in 1998.238 Iran's efforts to restore its military 
strength through an independent medium range ballistic missile 
production capability triggered the GCC reaction to acquire additional 
arms, principally anti-ballistic missile systems and additional combat 
aircraft. Furthermore, in a significant break from its historically limited 
military cooperation, the GCC states are closely cooperating to network 
their air defense assets. 
CONCLUSION 
Saudi Arabia's ability to protect its national security interests from 
foreign and domestic threats are paramount to the stability of the global 
economy. The House of Saud have demonstrated their resolve not only to 
maintain the continuous flow of crude but to adhere to market pricing; 
the ability of the House of Saud to defend themselves from internal 
challenges should also be of paramount concern to consumers of Saudi 
Arabian crude oil.239 
What Parts of Jervis' Theory do not Appear to Apply? 
Two areas of Jervis' theory do not apply to the case involving Saudi 
Arabia's foreign security policy. First and foremost is the presence of the 
United States as a regional hegemon that guarantees Saudi Arabia's 
foreign security and internal stability. 'Pax Americana,' the United States 
military presence in the Persian Gulf after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq 
Conflict, continues to the present time, in the form of continued arms sales 
and support services to the GCC states. The rise of organized Islamic 
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fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia poses the greatest threat to the 
Kingdom's internal security.240 Saudi Arabia's strategy to rely on a 
technologically heavy air force rather than a large conscripted army 
necessitates a close, long-term relationship with the United States. 
Although Saudi Arabia seeks to distance its dependence on the United 
States for security due to criticism of fundamental Islamic groups, which 
claim the House of Saud is deviating from purist Islamic beliefs the regime 
is founded on, Saudi Arabia's dependence on the United States to supply, 
train, and maintain its armed forces will only increase as technology 
advances and the need for Kingdom's need to secure its vital assets 
remains constant. 
The second area concerns Jervis' definition of two variables of the 
theory, the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiation. 
Jervis proposes to measure the first variable, the offense-defense balance, 
by asking 'does the state have to spend more or less than one dollar on 
defensive forces to offset each dollar spent by the other side on forces 
that could be used to attack' and 'with a given inventory of forces, is it 
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better to attack or to defend?'241 A state has the 'offensive advantage' 
when it is easier to destroy the others' military and annex territory, whereas 
'defensive advantage' means it is easier to defend territory from an 
attack. The offense-defense balance is of little use because Saudi 
Arabia's national security assets comprise a geographically minute area; 
should an adversary desire to inflict extensive damage, Abqaiq and Ras 
Tanurah would be ideal targets. (Recall Iran's attempts to target Ras 
Tanurah in the 1980s and the foiled attack on Abqaiq in February 2006 by 
Al-Qaeda) 
Utilizing the concept of offense-defense differentiation, the second 
variable, is also of little value. Jervis defines differentiation as 'whether 
weapons and policies that protect the state also provide the capability 
for attack.'242 Jervis questions the ability to concisely define 
differentiation, conceding 'no simple and unambiguous definition is 
possible and in many cases no judgment can be reached.'243 
Technological improvements commencing in the 1980s enabled aircraft 
manufacturers to produce multi-role aircraft that merged the role of 
offense and defensive capabilities. The benefit to merging defensive and 
offensive capabilities is increased flexibility, reduced aircrew and support 
services training, leading to decreased costs. Saudi Arabia's strategy for 
external security relies on a high-technology air force; since modern 
combat aircraft blur the distinction between offensive and defensive 
capabilities it is difficult to apply the concept to this case. 
What the Case Tells Us About Jervis' Theory 
The case involving Saudi Arabia's security policy illustrates that the 
general premise of the theory, states that attempt to increase their 
security may inadvertently threaten others and suffer a decrease in 
security, appears to apply despite the inability to use two central variables 
of the theory. By deploying an advanced air defense capability, Saudi 
Arabia and the five other GCC states have removed an air attack as a 
viable option for Iran to attack, compelling Iran to seek alternate means 
to threaten them. The Iranian Islamic Revolution distilled in Iran the 
importance of achieving an independent arms development, production, 
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and maintenance capability; the Islamic Revolution terminated the first 
spiral but also initiated the second spiral. Finding itself isolated and unable 
to support their American-supplied Air Force after the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution, Iran decided to pursue an independent ballistic missile 
production capability to regain its military strength. There is no need to 
utilize offense-defense balance and differentiation in this case; this case is 
indicative in a more fundamental sense that states will pursue measures 
they perceive as necessary to increase their security regardless of whether 
these measures will inadvertently threaten other states. 
What Jervis' Theory Tells Us About the Case 
Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program, specifically the allegations 
leveled that the objective of its nuclear enrichment program is to produce 
weapons-grade uranium useful in an atomic device is certainly alarming. 
As Jervis' theory expects states to continue to pursue measures to 
increase their security, the nuclear developments are, however, the 
logical step for Iran to pursue. Although no international verification of 
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Iran's claim that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes has 
occurred, Iran's actual behavior is inconsistent with a peaceful nuclear 
program.244 Iran appears to be pursuing a nuclear weapons delivery 
capability.245 One of the Iranian regime's cardinal fears is an American 
invasion; in light of the rapid fall of the Iraqi regime to American forces, 
Iran perceives a strong deterrent is necessary to safeguard the regime.246 
Fearful that a nuclear-capable Iran will pursue an aggressive foreign 
policy, other states in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, may pursue 
their own nuclear weapons capability as a deterrence, intensifying the 
current downwards spiral.247 A nuclear-capable Iran will have profound 
consequences on Saudi Arabia's foreign and internal security. Statements 
from officials of GCC member states indicates their high level of concern 
of a nuclear-capable Iran. An unnamed official from an declares 'If the 
military option happens, we will have no problem with that,' in reference 
to American or Israeli airstrikes on Iran's suspected nuclear facilities; the 
same official states 'If we reach a point where the choice is living with a 
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nuclear Iran or suffering the consequences of an attack, we would 
choose the latter.'248 
Saudi Arabia and the GCC states will be compelled to react since 
their air defense capabilities may not be able to defeat a determined 
barrage of Iranian missiles; Iran may also chose to deliver the warhead 
through unconventional means, completely bypassing conventional 
delivery methods. Saudi Arabia will therefore experience additional 
pressure on its internal security. Any deterrent advantage Saudi Arabia 
has due to its advanced, albeit limited airstrike capabilities may therefore 
be rendered useless if Iran is declared a nuclear capable state. A readily 
available option may be to enlist the services of other declared nuclear 
states, namely Pakistan in order to obtain an immediate deterrent; the 
Kingdom has utilized the services of the Pakistani military in the past.249 
It is in the interest of all world actors to prevent an all-out nuclear 
arms race in the Persian Gulf, especially states that depend on Saudi 
Arabia for crude oil. To this end, as the regional hegemon and because 
the United States deems the continuous flow of reasonably priced crude 
oil as a vital national security interest, the United States will be compelled 
to adopt a leadership position to prevent the current spiral from taking on 
an atomic dimension. Unfortunately, since both sides appear intent on 
adding more weapons to their arsenal, breaking the current spiral may 
prove more difficult than the previous spiral. 
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29
 (Energy Information Administration, 2) 
30
 Saudi Arabian oilfields are unique due to their naturally high reservoir 
pressure. The importance of naturally high reservoir pressure at Saudi 
Arabian oil fields to compensate for the decline in United States 
production cannot be understated; production from the Ghawar oil field, 
the single largest crude oil reservoir in the world, increased from 906,000 
barrels per day in 1965 to 4,653,000 barrels per day in 1974, a growth rate 
unmatched by any other oil reservoir in the world. (Simmons, 48) 
31
 (Energy Information Administration, 10) 
32
 (Energy Information Administration, 6) 
33
 (Energy Information Administration, 6) 
34
 ((Pollack, 16) 
35
 (Energy Information Administration, 8) 
36
 (Energy Information Administration, 6), (Pollack, 16) 
37
 (Energy Information Administration, 10) 
38(Bronson, 154, 164) 
39
 (Energy Information Administration, 10) 
40
 (Energy Information Administration, 10) 
41
 The following is a brief verse on the relationship between state formation 
and the necessity to protect its national security assets from foreign and 
domestic threats. 
Declared unified by Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Saud on 
September 23, 1932, Saudi Arabia is a relatively new state. Ibn Saud 
created the modern Saudi Arabian state in the early 20th century by 
conquest. (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, The Foreign Policies of Middle East 
States, 199) The four geographical areas of the state have 'rarely, since 
the time of the Prophet Muhammad, been united under one rule' and 
'retain strong senses of regional identity.' (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 
The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 199-200) According to 
Ghassane Salameh and Vivian Steir, 'the tribe has consistently provided 
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the basis for social and political organization in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Any attempt to increase power beyond the tribe has invariably been 
based on religion.' (Salameh and Steir 1980, 5) To increase the size of his 
empire, Ibn Saud drew on 'the long historical association between the Al-
Saud and the puritanical, reformist Islamist strain known in the West as 
"Wahhabism."' (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 200) In exchange for 
guarantees of security from their rivals, descendants of Muhammad ibn 
Al-Wahhab afforded the Al-Saud 'an association which lifted it above 
other merely tribal powers,' providing Ibn Saud with the 'ideological 
justification for the expansion of Saudi rule.' (Salameh and Steir, 5) 
The regionalized nature of the new Saudi empire caused many of 
Ibn Saud's new subjects to be weary of Saudi hegemony. (Hinnebusch 
and Ehteshami, 200) Al-Wahhab and his descendents regarded the Shi'a, 
concentrated in the Al-Hasa and Qatif regions in the oil-producing Persian 
Gulf region, as 'little better than unbelievers;' in the western Hijaz region, 
'many Hijazis, accustomed to more liberal social mores, chafed under the 
Puritanism of the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.' (Hinnebusch and 
Ehteshami, 200) 
The expectation for little but political loyalty in exchange for 
providing a plethora of free or low-cost government services, including 
security, no taxation, health care, education, loans, housing, and 
employment is creating its set of growing problems. (Pollack, 81) 
Accustomed to foreigners performing skilled and unskilled tasks has 
created a 'crippling work culture,' whereby 'two-thirds of the workers in 
the Gulf region are expatriates while much of the population is either 
unemployed or does not participate in the workforce at all.' (Pollack, 81-
82) 2008 data from the IISS estimates expatriate workers constitute 27% of 
the Saudi population. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, 
260) 2003-2004 data from unofficial sources estimated unemployment in 
Saudi Arabia at between 25 to 30 percent, whereas government sources 
claimed unemployment atl 3 percent. (Pollack, 75) Data from 2007 
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illustrate that Saudi Arabia's population is disproportionally young (38.2% 
are between the ages ot 0-14, 59.4% are between the ages of 15-64) and 
is growing rapidly (2.06%) (Central Intelligence Agency, 3) 
Accustomed to undemanding government or private sector jobs as 
a reward for political loyalty is expected and pervasive although these 
highly sought positions are becoming increasingly sparse. (Pollack, 105) 
The rapid population growth 'has contributed to some of the highest 
levels of unemployment in the world and relatively low employment-to-
population ratios.' (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, 
232) High unemployment, in turn, is breeding restlessness and religious 
extremism while the rapidly growing population increases the burden of 
the state to provide material benefits to keep the population submissive. 
(Pollack, 107) 
42
 (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 193) 
43
 Kenneth Pollack writes 'Paranoia is a guiding principle of all of the 
Muslim Middle Eastern regimes, to a greater or lesser extent.' (Pollack, 
103) James Quinlivan asserts the House of Saud has successfully applied 
balancing mechanisms to 'coup-proof the regime, a mission 'best 
accomplished by a ground-based parallel military'. (Quinlivan 1999, 142) 
Data from 2008 validates Quinlivan's assertion. The Army has 75,000 
soldiers, whereas the National Guard has 75,000 full-time soldiers and 
25,000 reserves. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, 260, 
262) A review of the staffing levels of other states in the Middle East 
suggests not only is Saudi Arabia's conventional Army to parallel military 
staffing ratio is high but the size of the conventional Army appears 
disproportionately small. Bahrain (6000 to 2000), Kuwait (11,000 to 6,600), 
and Oman (25,000 to 4,000) are three other GCC member states with 
parallel militaries. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, 238, 
250-251, 257-258) At 88,000 soldiers, Jordan's conventional Army is 17% 
larger than Saudi Arabia's; even the United Arab Emirates' Army has 
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44,000 soldiers, 59% the size of Saudi Arabia, which is approximately 2.5 
times the geographic size and has roughly five times the population of 
either state. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, 248, 266) 
Ghassane Salameh and Vivian Steir assert the House of Saud faces 
a 'dilemma between defending the country and defending the 
monarchy,' further writing 'the monarchy, anxious to defend its wealth, 
seems to fear the potentially high political price of a strong army.' 
(Salameh and Steir, 9) F. Gregory Gause III argues 'experience with 
several attempted Arab-nationalist military coups in the 1960s undermined 
the regime's confidence in the likely political reliability of a large military,' 
further stating 'Residual suspicion of Hijazis and Shi'ites add to the regime's 
reluctance to expand the size of the Saudi military, an argument shared 
by Salamah and Steir (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 202) Hinnebusch 
argues the military is the most common instrument of regime change in 
the Middle East, and that the House of Saudi perceives its ability to survive 
depends on its ability to control the military and organized labor, 'the two 
groups that were the potential vehicles of opposition,' citing a defection 
of Saudi pilots to Egypt in the 1960s and the crushing of a Libyan-inspired 
plot as adding to the suspicion of the House of Saud. (Hinnebusch, 124-
125)43 Citing Gause, Hinnebusch theorizes the House of Saud has not 
increased the size of the Army 'from fear that a conscripted population 
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